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Abstract 
This paper addresses a current theoretical debate between modular and interactive accounts 
of sarcasm processing, by investigating the role of context (specifically, knowing that a 
character has been sarcastic before) in the comprehension of a sarcastic remark. An eye-
tracking experiment was conducted where participants were asked to read texts that 
introduced a character as being either sarcastic or not, and ended in either a literal or an 
unfamiliar sarcastic remark. The results indicated that when the character was previously 
literal, a subsequent sarcastic remark was more difficult to process than its literal counterpart. 
However, when the context was supportive of the sarcastic interpretation (i.e., the character 
was known to be sarcastic), subsequent sarcastic remarks were as easy to read as literal 
equivalents, which would support the predictions of interactive accounts. Importantly, this 
effect was not preceded by a main effect of literality, which constitutes evidence against the 
predictions of modular accounts. 
Keywords: sarcasm; irony; language comprehension; figurative language; eye-tracking. 
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Introduction 
 Using sarcasm carries the risk that the reader might misinterpret the message as being 
literal. For example, imagine that you text your friend Maya about your idea to go and see a 
spoken word performance together, and she texts you a reply saying, “Your idea is great”. If 
Maya was being sarcastic but you fail to interpret the message as such, that will lead to a 
disruption in your communication. However, it can be very difficult to interpret the message 
as sarcastic unless you already know, for example, that Maya dislikes spoken word 
performances and so she cannot literally mean that your idea is great. In other words, having 
some contextual information might help you to correctly interpret a sarcastic message.  
Theories of sarcasm processing  
A central topic of investigation in the psycholinguistics literature has been to examine 
the influence of context on language processing at various levels (i.e., syntactic, semantic, 
pragmatic). These investigations have typically been couched in terms of contrasting the 
predictions of modular versus interactive accounts of language processing (see e.g., Degen & 
Tanenhaus, 2019, for recent relevant discussion). This modular versus interactive debate also 
extends to the current domain of investigation, in that there is disagreement amongst theorists 
over the role played by context in sarcasm processing.  
Modular accounts, such as the standard pragmatic model (Grice, 1975) or the graded 
salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997; 2003), propose that the initial stages of sarcasm 
comprehension are not affected by contextual information. The standard pragmatic model 
claims that when a sarcastic remark is encountered, the literal meaning is accessed first, and 
is later replaced by the sarcastic meaning when the reader realises that the literal meaning 
does not fit with the context. Therefore, it predicts that literal comments should be processed 
faster (i.e., read more quickly) than sarcastic ones irrespective of contextual factors, due to 
the extra steps involved in sarcasm processing.  
 4 
The graded salience hypothesis (recently subsumed by the defaultness hypothesis, 
e.g., Giora, Drucker, Fein, & Mendelson, 2015) claims that the salient meaning (or default 
interpretation) of a comment will be accessed (or constructed) initially, independently of 
context. If the sarcastic remark is familiar (often used as sarcastic, and hence the sarcastic 
meaning is readily available to the reader even outside of context, e.g., “That’s just great!”), 
the sarcastic meaning can be accessed directly, and should be processed as quickly as a literal 
equivalent. In contrast, for unfamiliar comments (i.e., comments that are rarely, if ever, used 
sarcastically), the graded salience hypothesis makes the same prediction as the standard 
pragmatic model. Even a context which strongly supports the non-salient (e.g., sarcastic) 
meaning cannot prevent the initial activation of the salient (literal) meaning (Giora, 1997). 
 In contrast, interactive accounts such as the echoic mention theory (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1981), direct access view (Gibbs, 1986), implicit display theory (Utsumi, 2000), or 
constraint satisfaction model (Pexman, 2008), assign a key role to contextual factors (see also 
Gibbs, 1979; and Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978, for earlier, related work on 
context effects). These accounts predict that a sarcastic comment could be correctly 
interpreted as soon as it is encountered if it echoes an explicit contextual expectation (echoic 
mention theory), a discrepancy between expectation and reality is contained in the context 
(direct access view), or the context constitutes an ironic environment (the speaker has an 
unmet expectation that the listener is aware of, and the speaker has a negative emotional 
attitude towards the incongruity between expectation and reality – implicit display theory). 
The constraint satisfaction model is currently a framework that allows for many different and 
unspecified contextual factors to act as cues for sarcasm. 
The influence of context on sarcasm processing 
 In the first study to show context effects on reading times, Gibbs (1986, Experiment 
1) reported shorter sentence reading times for ironic comments (e.g., “You are a fine friend”) 
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compared to non-ironic controls (e.g., “You are a bad friend”). Additionally, when reading 
times for sentences with the same surface form (“You are a fine friend”) were compared in 
ironic (somebody not being a good friend) and non-ironic (somebody being a good friend) 
contexts, there were no differences - findings taken in support of the direct access model. 
However, simple non-ironic acknowledgements like “You are a good friend” were read more 
quickly than ironic comments (see Giora, 1995, for further discussion and refutation of 
Gibbs’ results).  
More recently, in a series of eye-tracking and reading experiments, we have aimed to 
systematically investigate various different contextual cues that have been proposed to have a 
key influence. Specifically, in investigating the predictions made by the implicit display 
theory, we found that making the speaker’s (unmet) expectation explicit in the context did not 
reduce or eliminate processing difficulty for sarcastic utterances compared to literal controls, 
thus providing no support for this theory (Țurcan & Filik, 2016). In contrast, in a subsequent 
study testing the predictions of the echoic mention theory, we found that when sarcastic 
comments echoed an explicit contextual antecedent, this did make processing of sarcastic 
utterances as fast as literal equivalents, thus providing some evidence that context can 
influence processing (Țurcan & Filik, 2017). Evidently, it seems to be the case that while 
some contextual factors have the predicted influence on processing, others do not. 
A further contextual factor that has received a lot of interest, but has led to mixed 
results, is the influence of speaker characteristics on processing and interpretation. Speaker 
characteristics (such as talker-specificity) have recently been shown to influence language 
comprehension in a number of domains, such as the interpretation of quantifiers (Yildrim, 
Degen, Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016), referring expressions (Pogue, Kurumada, & Tanenhaus, 
2016), and in making stereotype-based inferences (e.g., van Berkum, van den Brink, Tesink, 
Kos, & Hagoort, 2008). Some studies have also examined the influence of speaker properties, 
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such as speaker occupation, on irony comprehension (see Katz, Blasko, & Kazmerski, 2006, 
for an overview). For instance, Katz and Pexman (1997) presented readers with ambiguous 
statements such as Children are precious gems, which can either be interpreted 
metaphorically (i.e., that children are valuable) or as ironic metaphors (in which they are not). 
They found that when the comments were stated as being uttered by someone from a “high-
irony” profession (such as a comedian) they were judged as being more sarcastic and 
mocking than when uttered by a speaker from a “high-metaphor” profession (e.g., a priest). 
Pexman and Olineck (2002) later reported a similar finding for statements that were 
ambiguous between a literal and ironic interpretation (e.g., You are a wonderful/terrible 
friend), when other contextual cues were minimal. In a follow-up of the Katz and Pexman 
(1997) study, using word-by-word self-paced reading, Pexman, Ferretti, and Katz (2000) 
found that mention of speaker occupation also influenced reading times for statements that 
were ambiguous between a metaphorical and ironic metaphor reading. However, they did not 
directly assess whether speaker occupation eliminated processing difficulty for ironic 
utterances versus non-ironic counterparts.  
Another speaker-related factor that has received some attention in the literature is 
whether the context introduces a character as typically sarcastic (i.e., the character has used 
sarcasm before), or not. For example, in a self-paced reading task, Giora et al. (2007, 
Experiment 1) presented participants with dialogues between two characters, one of which 
uttered a sarcastic remark midway through the dialogue, followed by another literal or 
sarcastic remark. They found that even when a sarcastic character was introduced into the 
story, a subsequent sarcastic remark uttered by that character was still read more slowly than 
a literal remark. Later, Fein, Yeari, and Giora (2015) slightly altered Giora et al.’s materials 
to ensure that participants clearly understood hat the mid-context utterance was sarcastic. 
They did this by including a cue in the dialogue (e.g., Sagit (derisively): You’re a really 
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active guy). They found that even when a sarcastic character was more explicitly introduced 
into the story, subsequent sarcastic comments were still slower to read than literal ones. Their 
conclusion was that even when the context creates an expectation for sarcasm by introducing 
a sarcastic character, the activation of the literal meaning cannot be overridden, and hence the 
processing of a sarcastic remark is still more difficult than that of a literal remark, as 
predicted by modular accounts. 
 In an event-related potential (ERP) study, Regel, Coulson, and Gunter (2010) asked 
participants to read scenarios in order to get used to the communicative style of two 
characters – in the first half of the experiment one character used sarcasm 70% of the time 
and the other 30% of the time, while in the second half both characters uttered equal 
proportions of sarcastic and literal comments. Results showed that learning that a character 
was sarcastic modulated the neurocognitive processes underlying both early and late stages of 
sarcasm comprehension. Specifically, both P200 and P600 amplitudes were larger for 
sarcastic than literal comments when made by non-sarcastic speakers, but they were equal for 
literal and sarcastic comments made by sarcastic speakers. These findings were considered 
evidence for interactive accounts. 
 Thus, previous studies have led to conflicting results. Giora et al. and Fein et al. found 
no effect of context on sarcasm processing, but it should be noted that their dependent 
measure was the total reading time of the entire target utterance. In the absence of more fine-
grained measures, it is possible to miss contextual effects if they were only present during 
certain stages of comprehension or on certain regions of the target utterance. Regel et al. did 
find that context can have an effect on sarcasm comprehension. However, their study design 
allowed participants to accumulate a wealth of information regarding the communicative 
style of the speakers in their stimuli, since there were only two (one established as highly 
ironic, and one as mostly literal). It is of interest to assess whether the same effect can be 
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observed in a design which introduces new interlocutors within each trial (for which 
contextual information would then need to be assessed and utilised more rapidly). Finally, in 
all three studies participants read the stimuli sentence-by-sentence or word-by-word. They 
therefore did not have the opportunity to read as they would normally (e.g., to return to text 
that they have previously read), which may be important for sarcasm comprehension (see 
Olkoniemi, Johander, & Kaakinen, 2019, for recent discussion).  
The current study  
The current study was designed to further investigate whether contextual cues can 
affect the processing of a subsequent sarcastic remark. Participants will have their eye 
movements monitored whilst they read literal or sarcastic target sentences that are contained 
in dialogues in which the speaker of the target utterance is previously introduced as being 
sarcastic or not (see Table 1). Thus, we are following the approach of Fein et al. (2015), but 
using a methodology which allows for a more fine-grained analysis of the reading process. 
Stimulus presentation will be natural, with one entire experimental scenario being presented 
at once on the screen, allowing participants to read and re-read as they would normally. A 
number of different reading time measures will be calculated, allowing us to examine in some 
detail how readers process sarcastic language. Specifically, calculating first-pass reading 
time will allow is to assess whether readers experience immediate difficulty on encountering 
a region of text, by summing the duration of initial fixations within a region. Regression path 
reading time will allow us to examine whether readers have gone back to re-read earlier 
portions of text in order to overcome this processing difficulty, by adding any additional time 
spent re-reading the region (or earlier regions) before the reader moves on in the text. Total 
reading time will indicate overall processing difficulty by summing the total time spent 
fixating a region (including re-reading). Finally, we will further bolster the contextual 
manipulation employed by Fein et al. (2015), in that we will state more explicitly that the 
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character is being sarcastic in the sarcasm biasing context condition (i.e., will state said 
sarcastically, rather than said derisively).  
Predictions 
Modular accounts would predict a main effect of literality prior to any interaction 
with context, since for unfamiliar sarcastic comments (which will be utilised here) the 
(salient) literal meaning of the comment should always be accessed first, regardless of 
context. There are a large number of ways in which such a pattern of effects could manifest 
in the eye movement record. To illustrate but a few - a main effect of literality could occur, 
for example, in early measures of reading time (e.g., first-pass reading times) on the critical 
word which disambiguates the target comment as being literal or sarcastic. A relatively 
delayed interaction with context may then be observed, for example: in later measures of 
reading time on the critical disambiguating word itself (e.g., regression path or total reading 
times); in measures which could be indicative of re-reading of previous parts of the text (such 
as total reading times on the pre-critical region), or in any measure of reading time on the 
post-critical region of text. Regardless of the precise pattern of effects that might be 
observed, the key prediction is that a main effect of literality should arise before any 
interaction with context. 
In contrast, interactive accounts would predict no main effect of literality before an 
interaction between literality and context is observed. Specifically, there should be no 
difference in reading times between a literal and a sarcastic remark when the character is 
known to be sarcastic, or, potentially, there should be shorter reading times for sarcastic 
remarks. In contrast, there should be longer reading times for sarcasm when a character is 




 Thirty-two native English speakers from the University of Nottingham took part (Mage 
= 22.9 years old, SD = 6.9 years old, 27 females). They were not diagnosed with any reading 
difficulties, had normal or corrected vision, and received course credit for their participation. 
The study was approved by the School of Psychology ethics committee (ref: 245). 
 Materials and design 
 Thirty-two experimental stimuli were created, each containing eight sentences 
describing a conversation between two characters (see Table 1 for an example). The first two 
sentences described the context in which the scenario was set (e.g., Laura and Henry had 
been living together for over a year now. Laura asked Henry to clean the kitchen whilst she 
was at work.). The remaining scenario was presented as a dialogue between the two 
characters. The third sentence was a line uttered by one of the characters, and was the same 
across all conditions (e.g., Laura: Did you clean the kitchen like I asked?).  
 The fourth sentence was different depending on whether one of the characters was 
introduced as literal or as sarcastic. For the example in Table 1, in the condition where Laura 
was introduced as a literal character, the fourth sentence was: Henry: I cleaned the living 
room and dining room first, and was just about to start on the kitchen., to which Laura’s 
response (fifth sentence) was a literal one, Laura: Well that was nice of you!. In the condition 
where Laura was introduced as a sarcastic character, the fourth sentence was: Henry: Not 
quite. I put out the cleaning spray and some cloths, and was about to start., to which Laura’s 
response was a sarcastic one: Laura said sarcastically: Well that was nice of you!.  
 The sixth sentence differed between the literal and sarcastic target conditions. When 
the sixth sentence was: Henry: I’ll clean the kitchen now whilst you have a bath., the 
subsequent target utterance was designed to be interpreted literally, Laura: I knew you were 
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gallant!. On the other hand, when the sixth utterance was: Henry: Anyway, you can do it now 
that you’re back., the same target utterance was to be interpreted sarcastically. All sarcastic 
utterances were unfamiliar (see below for familiarity pre-test). Finally, the eighth sentence 
wrapped up the scenario (e.g., Henry: Do you want to have some takeaway tonight?). 
Thirteen of the experimental stimuli contained a male speaker, while 19 contained a female 
speaker. 
 Thus, the experiment consisted of a 2 literality (literal target remark vs. sarcastic 
target remark) x 2 context (literal character vs. sarcastic character) design, with both factors 
being within-subjects and within-items. Thirty-five filler items accompanied the experimental 
scenarios. They had the same structure as the experimental items, but only contained literal 
utterances.  
 As each scenario had four versions, one for each experimental condition, four 
stimulus presentation files were created, each containing only one version of each scenario, 
and a total of eight experimental items for each condition. This was to ensure that participants 
were exposed to each scenario in only one experimental condition. Each participant was 
presented with one stimulus file. The order in which the scenarios were presented within each 
stimulus file was randomised for each participant. 
 
< insert Table 1 here > 
 
 Familiarity pre-test. A questionnaire containing 147 target utterances in isolation was 
given to nine native English speakers (Mage = 26.8 years old, SD = 8.1 years old, five 
females). Their task was to rate on a scale from 1 (unfamiliar) to 8 (familiar) how familiar 
they were with the sarcastic meaning of each phrase. Thirty-two remarks were selected, with 
a mean familiarity score of 2.8, SEM = 0.12 (see Appendix for full set of target utterances). A 
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one-sample t-test showed that there was a significant difference between the familiarity 
scores of the selected target utterances and the middle of the scale, t(31) = 14.1, p < 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.50. 
 Interpretation pre-test. In order to assess whether the target comments were likely to 
be interpreted as intended, we created four questionnaires containing all 32 experimental 
scenarios (with each scenario appearing in only one condition per questionnaire, presented in 
random order). After reading each scenario, participants were asked to rate how likely they 
thought it was that the character truly held the belief in the test sentence, on a scale from 1 
(very unlikely) to 8 (very likely). If comments were interpreted sarcastically, we expected 
participants to rate them towards the bottom of the scale, as in those cases the characters do 
not hold the beliefs expressed in the test sentences. A total of 31 participants (17 female, age 
range from 20 to 31 years old, Mage = 24 years old, SDage = 2 years and 5 months) filled in the 
questionnaires.  
A one-sample t-test comparing the mean of the sarcastic ratings with the middle of the 
scale yielded significant results, indicating that the sarcastic materials were rated significantly 
lower, t(30) = 13.33, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.39. Thus, when the final comment was 
sarcastic, readers did understand that the expressed belief was unlikely to be true. 
Furthermore, a paired-samples t-test showed that the sarcastic condition resulted in 
significantly lower ratings that the literal condition (Msarcastic = 2.3, SEMsarcastic = 0.13; Mliteral 
= 5.7, SEMliteral = 0.13), t(30) = 16.98, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.05, as expected. Taken 
together, we believe that these results allow us to confidently assume that the target 
comments used in this study were generally interpreted as intended.  
 Procedure 
 Eye movements were recorded via an SR Research EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker that 
sampled eye position every millisecond. Materials were displayed on a computer screen 
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56cm from participants’ eyes. Participants were instructed to read as they would normally for 
comprehension. Each trial consisted of one scenario, presented in its entirety on the screen, 
with two blank lines between each line of text. Participants pressed the right-shoulder button 
on a hand-held controller to progress to the next trial. 
 After 25% of trials, a yes/no comprehension question was asked (see Table 1). The 
average correct response rate of 89.3% (SD = 7.31) indicated that participants were reading 
for comprehension. 
Results 
 The scenarios had three analysis regions (see Table 1). The critical region was the 
word that disambiguated the target utterance as being either sarcastic or literal. Following 
Țurcan and Filik (2016; 2017), the pre-critical region comprised the two words that preceded 
the disambiguating word. This was to avoid excessive data losses due to the single word 
immediately prior to the critical region often being very short (such as is, of, so etc.) and 
therefore likely to be skipped. The post-critical region was the three words that followed the 
disambiguating word. Since this region always contained the name of the character who was 
speaking, we reasoned that by the end of the passage (where the target comment occurred), 
participants might no longer fixate the character name (since it is repeated throughout). 
Therefore, we included the character name plus two content words in the post-critical region 
(we included two rather than one, as again, some of these words might be very short words 
such as I, do, my, we, etc.). 
Fixations under 80ms were incorporated into larger adjacent fixations within one 
character, and fixations under 40ms that were not within three characters of another fixation 
were deleted, as were fixations over 1200ms. Trials that had zero first-pass reading times for 
two consecutive regions (where regions were defined as a whole sentence in the context, the 
pre-critical, critical, and post-critical regions) were eliminated (discarded trials accounted for 
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5.4% of the data). Three measures of reading behaviour are reported. First-pass reading time 
(fp) is the sum of all fixations in a region from first entering it until leaving it either via its 
left or right boundary. Regression path reading time (rp) is the sum of all fixations on a 
region and on preceding regions from first entering the region to first going past it, that is, 
leaving it via its right boundary. Total reading time (tt) is the sum of all fixations in a region, 
including fixations made when re-reading the region. When reading times were zero for a 
particular region, the relevant point was excluded from the analyses, and means were 
calculated from the remaining data points in the design cell (see Table 2 for percentage of 
data removed following this procedure). 
 Data analysis was performed in R (R Core Team, 2013) using linear mixed effects 
modeling (lme4 package). We report the regression coefficients (b), t-values (t), p-values (p), 
95% confidence intervals, and the random effects structures with the variance and standard 
deviation (SD), where the lmerTest package was used to compute the p-values.   
 
< insert Table 2 here > 
 
 The next step was to establish the appropriate random effects structure for each 
analysis. We started by fitting the maximal model to the data, as recommended by Barr, 
Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013). We included literality (literal target remark vs. sarcastic 
target remark) and context (literal character vs. sarcastic character) as fixed factors in the 
model. For literality and context the fixed effects were coded using treatment contrasts: literal 
target remark = 0, sarcastic target remark = 1, literal character = 0, sarcastic character = 1. 
If the maximal model failed to converge, the random effects structure had to be simplified in 
order to obtain convergence. This was done by progressively removing one random 
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component at a time - the one that explained the least amount of variance in the previous 
nonconverging model. 
 Once the random effects structure had been established, the final step was to perform 
a series of likelihood ratio tests comparing the fit of models with progressively simpler fixed-
effects structures in order to reach the best model fit for our data1. For a more detailed 
discussion of the data analysis procedure, please see Țurcan and Filik (2016). See Table 3 for 
the models that had the best fit for our data and the values of their fixed-effects parameters 
and random structures.  
 
< insert Table 3 here > 
 
 The pre-critical region. There were no effects in any reading time measures (see 
Figure 1 – Pre-critical region). 
 The critical region. There were no effects in first-pass reading times on the critical 
region (see Figure 1 - Critical region - fp). However, an interaction was observed between the 
literality of the target comment and whether the character was known to be literal or sarcastic 
in the context, in both regression path and total reading times (see Figures 2 and 3 - Critical 
region - rp and tt).  
When a character had previously been literal in the context, there were shorter 
regression path reading times for literal target utterances than sarcastic utterances (rp: b = -
58.9, t = 2.7, p = .01, 2.5% CI = -101.4, 97.5% CI = -16.4). This effect did not reach 
significance in total reading times (tt: b = -32.1, t = 1.9, p = .06, 2.5% CI = -64.6, 97.5% CI = 
0.3). When a character had previously been sarcastic, there was no difference in reading 
times between literal and sarcastic target utterances (rp: b = 39.6, t = 1.8, p = .08, 2.5% CI = -
3.8, 97.5% CI = 83.1; tt: b = 10.5, t = 0.6, p = .53, 2.5% CI = -21.8, 97.5% CI = 42.8). This 
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suggests that when the context provided a cue for sarcasm (i.e., knowing that a character is 
sarcastic), this cue facilitated the comprehension of subsequent sarcastic remarks, such that 
they could be processed as easily as literal remarks.  
 The post-critical region. There were no effects in any reading time measures (see 
Figure 1 - Post-critical region). 
 
<Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 here> 
 
Discussion 
 The experiment described in this paper contrasted the predictions of modular and 
interactive accounts of sarcasm comprehension by examining whether a contextual factor, 
specifically, knowing that a character has been sarcastic before, can influence the processing 
of subsequent sarcastic remarks. 
Summary of findings  
An influence of context was observed on the way in which sarcastic utterances were 
processed in both regression path and total reading times, on the word that disambiguated the 
target utterance as being intended literally or sarcastically. Specifically, when the character 
had previously uttered a literal comment, then the target utterance resulted in longer reading 
times when it was intended sarcastically than when it was intended literally. In contrast, when 
the character had been introduced in the context as being sarcastic, readers no longer 
experienced processing difficulty for a sarcastic target utterance compared to its literal 
counterpart. 
Integration with previous empirical findings 
 The finding of longer reading times for a sarcastic comment uttered in a literal-biasing 
context would concur with previous research showing disruption to eye movements during 
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the reading of sarcastic utterances (Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge, & Benson, 2015; Filik 
et al., 2014; Filik, Howman, Ralph-Nearman, & Giora, 2018; Filik & Moxey, 2010; 
Kaakinen, Olkoniemi, Kinnari, & Hyönä, 2014; Olkoniemi et al., 2019; Olkoniemi, Ranta, & 
Kaakinen, 2016; Olkoniemi, Strömberg, & Kaakinen, 2019; Țurcan & Filik, 2016; 2017). 
Observing effects in measures of reading time that include some aspect of re-reading (i.e., 
regression path and total times) suggests that readers needed extra time to re-analyse 
utterances as being sarcastic. 
The finding that this processing difficulty was eliminated when the sarcastic comment 
was uttered in a supportive context is not consistent with the previous work of Giora et al. 
(2007, Experiment 1), who found that sarcastic target sentences took longer to read than 
literal controls, regardless of whether the character had previously made a sarcastic comment 
in the context. However, in their study, the character was not explicitly introduced in the 
context as being sarcastic, so it is possible that participants may not have picked up on the 
fact that the character was being sarcastic before (i.e., the contextual cue may not have been 
strong enough). In the related study of Fein et al. (2015), the authors did include a more 
explicit cue (e.g. derisively) regarding the character being sarcastic in the context, and in this 
case still found longer reading times for sarcastic than literal target sentences. It is still 
possible that their cue was not as explicit as the one used in the present experiment (i.e., said 
sarcastically), which might explain why we found a contextual effect while Fein et al. (2015) 
did not. It must be noted that by adopting the stronger manipulation of Fein et al. (2015), in 
which the attitude of the speaker is explicitly mentioned, we cannot say for certain whether it 
is the fact that a speaker has been previously sarcastic, or that sarcasm has been mentioned in 
the context (or some combination of the two) that leads to such a strong context effect. 
Further research is required to clarify this issue. 
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 The current data are more consistent with the findings of Regel et al. (2010), who 
showed that knowledge of a character’s sarcastic style facilitated sarcasm comprehension. 
However, the current data extend this finding to a different methodology, importantly, one in 
which participants can read naturally. In addition, in Regel et al.’s study, speaker effects were 
observed when the speaker was sarcastic across a majority of experiments trials (70%). In the 
current study, we show that it is sufficient for the speaker to have made one previous 
sarcastic comment in order for processing difficulty for subsequent sarcasm to be eliminated. 
This suggests a powerful role for certain contextual cues in the processing of sarcasm. 
Implications for theories of sarcasm processing  
In relation to the predictions of the various theories of sarcasm comprehension, it is 
crucial to note that in no reading measure or analysis region was a literality main effect 
found, that is, there was no evidence that literal comments were generally processed faster 
than sarcastic comments regardless of the contextual factor. This provides evidence against 
modular accounts, which would predict that literal (Grice, 1975) or salient (Giora, 1997; 
2003) interpretations cannot be blocked by the context. This would concur with the broad 
rejection of modular accounts across other domains such as syntactic processing (see e.g., 
Altmann, 1998, for discussion). 
Interactive accounts on the other hand could potentially explain both the absence of a 
main effect of literality and the effect of context on sarcasm comprehension. Interactive 
accounts all agree that embedding sarcastic utterances in contexts that support a sarcastic 
interpretation should facilitate the processing of that utterance when compared to a literal 
equivalent. However, they do not all agree on the specific factors that make a context 
supportive of a sarcastic interpretation. We now consider whether the various different 
interactive accounts mentioned in the Introduction can explain the current findings. In 
general, our results fit well with direct access type accounts (e.g., Gibbs, 1986; 2002), which 
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would predict that the ironic interpretation of a comment can be constructed directly, without 
first considering the literal interpretation, given a sufficiently supportive context. 
The current results also may be consistent with the predictions of implicit display 
theory (Utsumi, 2000) if we consider the previous mention of a sarcastic speaker to be 
contributing to an “ironic environment”, although the theory itself does not make this specific 
prediction with regards to a sarcastic speaker. However, in previous eye-tracking studies 
(Țurcan & Filik, 2016) we found that making the speaker’s expectation explicit in the 
context, which is stated as a key contributor to an ironic environment, did not have the 
expected effect on the reading times of subsequent sarcastic remarks, suggesting that implicit 
display theory cannot account for the full range of eye-tracking data. 
In relation to echoic mention theory, following this account we would have no reason 
to predict differences between cases in which a sarcastic speaker was or was not explicitly 
mentioned in the context, as neither case involves echoing a previous utterance. However, 
previous eye-tracking experiments have demonstrated that echoing an explicit contextual 
antecedent, as proposed by the echoic mention theory, did make processing sarcastic 
utterances as fast as literal equivalents (Țurcan & Filik, 2017).  
Taken together, our current results and those of our previous eye-tracking studies 
provide evidence against the modular accounts’ prediction that contextual factors cannot 
prevent the initial delay in sarcasm processing when compared to literal equivalents, but also 
that not all contextual factors have the effects predicted by specific interactive accounts. 
Conclusions 
Thus, there is no current theory that can easily explain all of the findings mentioned 
above. Although at first sight one might conclude that the constraint-satisfaction model could 
account for the results, it is important to remember that this model as it is currently 
instantiated (e.g., Pexman, 2008) is very general and it does not make clear, testable 
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predictions. In order to achieve the furtherment of a constraint-satisfaction model to account 
for sarcasm processing, researchers arguably first need to identify the relevant constraints that 
can influence processing. Some progress towards this has been attained by the growing body 
of empirical literature which has investigated a wealth of factors that might influence the 
processing and interpretation of sarcastic utterances. A tangible advancement could be made 
if these results were utilised to develop a more formal computational model from which 
explicit testable predictions can be made. This approach would concur with work in the 
broader experimental pragmatics literature which, although still in the very early stages, has 
seen recent steps towards the development of constraint-satisfaction models of certain aspects 
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Figure 1. Mean reading times for the pre-critical (top row), critical (middle row), and post-
critical (bottom row) regions. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Figure 2: Interaction between context and literality for regression path reading times in the 
critical region. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Figure 3: Interaction between context and literality for total reading times in the critical 
region. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
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Footnote 
1We also investigated the effect of presentation order, by adding it as a fixed effect to the 
models (in a similar procedure to Olkoniemi et al., 2019). There was no significant 
interaction between trial order and context or literality of the target comment, however there 
was a main effect of trial order on total reading time on the post-critical region, such that 
reading times in the second half of the experiment were 45.7ms shorter than in the first half 
of the experiment. The main effect suggests that participants re-read less as they proceeded 
through the experiment, potentially due to them getting used to the task. However, the lack of 
an interaction means that trial order did not interfere with the effects of context, which were 





Full list of target utterances 
1. Your humour is great! 
2. My kind of food!  
3. I knew you were gallant! 
4. Your look is very chic! 
5. That looks tasty! 
6. Your suggestion is stirring! 
7. Your help is always guaranteed! 
8. Your outfit is professional! 
9. Your work is progressing fast! 
10. You're doing things in so much haste! 
11. That was masterful!  
12. You're equipped so well! 
13. That's very courteous of you! 
14. Your help is priceless! 
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15. Your assistance is invaluable! 
16. You prepared thoroughly. 
17. This car is what we needed! 
18. Your suggestion was great! 
19. Your chivalry is unmatched. 
20. I like your willingness! 
21. Your idea is so adventurous! 
22. I appreciate your alertness! 
23. Our talk was impeccable! 
24. Your assistance was useful! 
25. That was systematic! 
26. Our office is well-ordered! 
27. Your choice is exhilarating! 
28. Your help was priceless! 
29. You got me impatient! 
30. Your food is delicious! 
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31. You packed them great! 
32. This lunch is great! 
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Laura and Henry had been living together for over 
a year now. Laura asked Henry to clean the 
kitchen whilst she was at work. 
Laura: Did you clean the kitchen like I asked? 
Henry: I cleaned the living room and dining room 
first, and was just about to start on the kitchen. 
Laura: Well that was nice of you! 
Henry: I’ll clean the kitchen now whilst you have 
a bath. 
Laura: I knew/ you were pre-critical region/ gallant! 
critical region/ 





Laura and Henry had been living together for over 
a year now. Laura asked Henry to clean the 
kitchen whilst she was at work. 
Laura: Did you clean the kitchen like I asked? 
Henry: Not quite. I put out the cleaning spray and 
some cloths, and was about to start. 
Laura said sarcastically: Well that was nice of 
you! 
Henry: I’ll clean the kitchen now whilst you have 
a bath. 
Laura: I knew/ you were pre-critical region/ gallant! 
critical region/ 







Laura and Henry had been living together for over 
a year now. Laura asked Henry to clean the 
kitchen whilst she was at work. 
Laura: Did you clean the kitchen like I asked? 
Henry: I cleaned the living room and dining room 
first, and was just about to start on the kitchen. 
Laura: Well that was nice of you! 
Henry: Anyway, you can do it now that you’re 
back. 
Laura: I knew/ you were pre-critical region/ gallant! 
critical region/ 




Laura and Henry had been living together for over 
a year now. Laura asked Henry to clean the 
kitchen whilst she was at work. 
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Laura: Did you clean the kitchen like I asked? 
Henry: Not quite. I put out the cleaning spray and 
some cloths, and was about to start. 
Laura said sarcastically: Well that was nice of 
you! 
Henry: Anyway, you can do it now that you’re 
back. 
Laura: I knew/ you were pre-critical region/ gallant! 
critical region/ 










Table 2. Summary of 0-ms reading time removal 
Analysis region Reading measure % of missing data 
pre-critical fp 20.5 
rp 20.5 
tt 3 
critical fp 10.6 
rp 10.4 
tt 9.2 


















fp ~ 1 + (1|subject) + 
(1|item) 
 






rp ~ 1 + (1 + 
context*literality|subject
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tt ~ 1 + (1 + 
literality|subject) + (1 + 
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fp ~ 1 + (1|subject) + (1 + 
context*literality|item) 
 

















rp ~ 1 + (1 + 
context*literality|subject
) + (1 + context|item) 
 






















tt ~ 1 + (1 + 
context*literality|subject
) + (1 + 
context*literality|item) 





























Notes. *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05; + p ≤ .10 
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